Theorem·T50
Soundness
Whatever a theory proves, it also semantically entails: nothing false in a model of the theory is ever provable from it.
For a language
,
, and
:
In words
For any formula, provability from a theory implies semantic entailment by it: provable consequences are always true consequences.
Never needed: F05 · F10 · F13 · A03 · A04 · A05 · A09 (computed from the citation graph, not asserted).
Proof
- 1Suppose , witnessed by a proof of from : , , , and every entry is justified by one of D104's four clauses. We show, by strong induction on (modus ponens and generalization may reach back to any earlier entry, not just the immediately preceding one): for every L-structure with : .
- 2Logical axiom. If is a logical axiom: by T47, T48, or T49 (whichever of the three kinds it is, D103): for *every* structure and assignment , not just models of ; in particular for any , with no need for the induction hypothesis.
- 3Assumption. If : directly from and the theory clause of D095, .
- 4
- 5
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∎
Remarks
Soundness confirms the deduction system never proves anything false - every provable formula holds in every model of the assumptions used to prove it. The converse, that every semantically entailed formula is provable, is Gödel's completeness theorem, built next via the Henkin construction: consistency, Lindenbaum's lemma extending any consistent theory to a maximal one, Henkin witnesses for existential claims, and a model built directly from the syntax of a maximal consistent theory containing them.